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Parliament’s Response to Charkaoui: 
Bill C-3 and the Special Advocate 
Regime under IRPA 
David Dunbar and Scott Nesbitt* 
Although the constitutionality of the legislative approach to terrorism 
will ultimately be determined by the judiciary in its role as the arbiter 
of constitutional disputes for the country, we must not forget that the 
legislative and executive branches also desire, as democratic agents of 
the highest rank, to seek solutions and approaches that conform to 
fundamental rights and freedoms.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some commentators have characterized the relationship between the 
judiciary and legislatures under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms2 as a “dialogue”. The metaphor initially was put forward in 
response to the anti-democratic critique of unelected judges striking 
down legislation. It emphasizes that judicial decisions in Charter cases 
rarely represent the final word on any particular legal issue. Such 
decisions usually do not simply invalidate government action; more 
typically, they define the broad constitutional parameters in which the 
government may pursue legitimate policy objectives and give 
legislatures an opportunity to consider their options. In this way, 
according to the dialogue metaphor, judicial decisions actually may 
encourage democratic debate and ensure that legislatures seek to 
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1
 Re Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 
S.C.R. 248, at para. 5 (S.C.C.). 
2
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Constitution Act 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
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accomplish their legitimate legislative objectives in a manner that 
conforms to constitutionally protected fundamental rights and freedoms.3 
Considered together, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in 
Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)4 and 
Parliament’s enactment of Bill C-35 illustrate how the constitutional 
dialogue can function effectively, even in the contentious context of 
national security law.6 In Charkaoui, the Court accepted that the security 
certificate regime under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act7 
was directed at legitimate policy objectives, namely, the removal of non-
citizens inadmissible to Canada and the protection of sensitive national 
security information. However, the Court also found two specific aspects 
of the statutory scheme to be unconstitutional: the absence of a timely 
detention review for foreign nationals named in a certificate; and the in 
camera, ex parte hearing process. The Court identified a series of 
options available to Parliament to remedy these constitutional infirmities 
and suspended its declaration of invalidity for one year to allow 
Parliament to determine whether, and if so how, to amend the 
provisions. Parliament, in turn, considered its options and amended the 
IRPA to include a special advocate regime. The result is a new 
legislative scheme which ensures that fundamental rights and freedoms 
are protected while still achieving the legitimate policy objectives 
underlying the certificate process. 
The remainder of the paper is organized into four parts. Part II 
provides background information on security certificates and explains 
the statutory regime at issue in Charkaoui. Part III reviews the 
Charkaoui decision, noting not only those specific aspects of the 
certificate regime which the Court found to be unconstitutional, but also 
                                                                                                             
3
 P. Hogg & A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (or 
perhaps the Charter of Rights isn’t such a bad thing after all)” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; K. 
Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin 
Law, 2001); and P. Hogg, A. Bushell & W. Wright, “Charter Dialogue Revisited — or ‘Much ado 
about metaphors’” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1. 
4
 [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Charkaoui”]. 
5
 An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and special 
advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, now S.C. 2008, c. 3 (in force 
February 22, 2008) [hereinafter “Bill C-3” or the “Bill”]. 
6
 See K. Roach, “Sharpening the Dialogue Debate: The Next Decade of Scholarship”, 
(2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 169, at 186-89, where the author suggests that “the post 9/11 security 
context may be a particularly rich site for institutional dialogue”. 
7
 S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”]. For ease of reference, when referring to 
provisions contained in the former Part 1, Division 9 of IRPA that Bill C-3 repealed, the citation 
“former IRPA” is used. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) RESPONSE TO CHARKAOUI 417 
the range of permissible action the Court afforded to Parliament for 
fixing those constitutional deficiencies. Next, Part IV explains the 
special advocate regime enacted under Bill C-3, its rationale and its 
subsequent implementation. Finally, Part V offers some brief concluding 
remarks. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE SECURITY CERTIFICATE REGIME  
UNDER IRPA 
Despite the significant attention they have attracted in recent years, 
security certificates have been a part of Canadian immigration law since 
1978.8 Although the precise contours of the statutory regime have 
evolved over time, its objective and basic features have remained fairly 
consistent. The certificate process is intended to facilitate the removal of 
non-citizens who endanger Canadian society because they are security 
risks or serious criminals.9 Certificates initiate a special deportation 
process that permits the government to rely on security or criminal 
intelligence information which is not disclosed to the permanent resident 
or foreign national named in the certificate (the “named person”) or their 
lawyers in order to establish the alleged grounds of inadmissibility. The 
certificate provisions also authorize detention or release on conditions 
incidental to the deportation proceedings. Certificates are used in 
relatively rare and exceptional cases; only 28 certificates have been 
issued since 1991.10 
The IRPA certificate provisions permit the Minister of Citizenship 
and Immigration and the Minister of Public Safety (the “Ministers”) to 
issue a certificate against a permanent or foreign national if they have 
reasonable grounds to believe the named person is inadmissible on the 
grounds of security, violating human or international rights, serious 
criminality or organized criminality.11 In security related matters, the 
Ministers’ decision usually is based on their review of a security 
intelligence report (or “SIR”) prepared by the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (“CSIS”). The power to issue a certificate rests with 
                                                                                                             
8
 Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss. 39-43. 
9
 Charkaoui, supra, note 4, at para. 4. 
10
 Canada, Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act, Fundamental Justice in 
Extraordinary Times: Main Report of the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act 
(Ottawa: February 2007) at 100-101, online at: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/ 
com-e/anti-e/rep-e/rep02feb07-e.htm> [hereinafter “Fundamental Justice in Extraordinary Times”]. 
11
 Former IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 77(1). 
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the Ministers personally, and cannot be delegated.12 Once the Ministers 
issue a certificate, it is referred to a designated judge of the Federal 
Court together with the SIR. If the judge determines the certificate to be 
reasonable, it becomes a final removal order.13 
Under the IRPA provisions in effect when Charkaoui was argued 
before the Supreme Court of Canada, the process for determining the 
reasonableness of the certificate involved both ordinary open court 
hearings and in camera, ex parte hearings where only counsel for the 
Ministers appeared before the Court. The judge was required to hold an 
in camera, ex parte hearing on the Ministers’ request.14 If the judge was 
satisfied that disclosure of the information the Ministers presented at a 
closed hearing would be injurious to national security or to the safety of 
any person (“confidential security information”),15 then that information 
remained confidential and could not be disclosed to the named person or 
their counsel.16 However, the judge could rely on the confidential 
security information and any other evidence considered appropriate to 
determine whether the certificate was reasonable.17 Although the named 
person did not receive the confidential security information, the 
provisions required the judge to provide a summary enabling the named 
person to be reasonably informed of the circumstances giving rise to the 
certificate.18 The statute also required the judge to give the named person 
an opportunity to be heard regarding the alleged inadmissibility.19 In 
most cases, this generally permitted named persons to testify, call their 
own witnesses and cross-examine witnesses the Ministers presented 
during the open hearing. 
The Federal Court judges conducting reasonableness hearings 
assumed an active role during the in camera, ex parte hearings. Their 
decisions demonstrated a rigorous testing of both the Ministers’ claim 
that certain information could not be disclosed to the named person or 
their counsel, as well as the reliability and sufficiency of that 
information in establishing the alleged grounds of inadmissibility. The 
                                                                                                             
12
 Id., at s. 6(3). 
13
 Id., at ss. 80-81. 
14
 Id., at s. 78(e). 
15
 The types of information protected from non-disclosure are described in Henrie v. 
Canada (Security Intelligence Review Committee), [1988] F.C.J. No. 965, 53 D.L.R. (4th) 568, at 
578-79 (F.C.T.D.), affd [1992] F.C.J. No. 100, 88 D.L.R. (4th) 575 (F.C.A.). 
16
 Former IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 78(b). 
17
 Id., at ss. 78(j) and 78(g). 
18
 Id., at s. 78(h). 
19
 Id., at s. 78(i). 
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judges would, for example, closely examine the information to look for 
the presence or absence of corroboration, and carefully scrutinize the 
credibility of human sources.20 
The detention provisions under the former IRPA certificate regime 
differed for permanent residents and foreign nationals. Permanent 
residents named in a certificate were detained only if the Ministers 
issued a warrant.21 However, foreign nationals were detained without a 
warrant once the Ministers issued the certificate.22 Permanent residents 
had an initial detention review within 48 hours of their arrest, and 
subsequent reviews at least once every six-month period until the judge 
determined whether the certificate was reasonable.23 Foreign nationals 
had no detention reviews before the reasonableness determination. 
However, if a certificate against either a permanent resident or foreign 
national was found to be reasonable and that person was not removed 
within the next 120 days, he or she could then apply for a detention 
review.24 The same in camera, ex parte hearing process that applied to 
the reasonableness determination also applied to detention reviews.25 
The determination that a certificate is reasonable does not 
necessarily result in the named person’s immediate removal. If, prior to 
the certificate being issued, the named person had been granted status as 
a protected person, they can be removed only if the Minister issues a 
danger opinion.26 Even if not previously recognized as a protected 
person, the named person still could apply for a pre-removal risk 
                                                                                                             
20
 See, e.g., Re Harkat, [2005] F.C.J. No. 481, 2005 FC 393, at paras. 93-101 (F.C.A.); Re 
Jaballah, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1706, 2006 FC 1230, at paras. 24-30 (F.C.A.); Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Mahjoub, [2005] F.C.J. No. 1948, 2005 FC 1596, at paras. 54-57 
(F.C.A.). 
21
 Former IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 82(1). 
22
 Id., at s. 82(2). 
23
 Id., at s. 83. At these pre-reasonableness reviews, the onus was on the Minister to satisfy 
the judge that the named person continues to be a danger to national security or to the safety of any 
person, or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding or for removal. 
24
 Id., at s. 84(2). At these post-reasonableness reviews, the onus was on the named person 
to establish that they would not be removed from Canada within a reasonable time and that release 
would not pose a danger to national security or to the safety of any person. 
25
 Id., at s. 83(1). 
26
 IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 115. Where the inadmissibility is based on serious criminality, 
the test is “danger to the public in Canada” (s. 115(1)). Where the inadmissibility is based on 
security, violating human or international rights or organized criminality, the test is whether the 
person “should not be allowed to remain in Canada on the basis of the nature and severity of acts 
committed or of danger to the security of Canada” (s. 115(2)). 
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assessment (“PRRA”) after the Ministers issued the certificate.27 The 
danger opinion and PRRA processes are similar in that they both require 
a Minister’s delegate to weigh the risk the named person would face if 
removed from Canada against the danger they would pose if permitted to 
remain in Canada. In some of the current certificate cases, the named 
persons’ successfully challenged danger opinion decisions in favour of 
removal, but have remained subject to detention or release on strict 
conditions pending re-determination of the decisions.28 
III. SETTING THE PARAMETERS: THE DECISION IN CHARKAOUI 
Prior to Charkaoui, the validity of the security certificate regime had 
been upheld on a number of occasions. For example, in Chiarelli, the 
Supreme Court dismissed challenges to the constitutionality of the 
certificate process brought by a permanent resident inadmissible for his 
involvement in organized crime. The Court held that the process 
satisfied the right to a fair hearing because the named person received a 
summary of the confidential intelligence reports and could cross-
examine police witnesses.29 In Ahani, the Federal Court of Appeal 
rejected arguments that the certificate process applicable to foreign 
nationals violated the Charter.30 And, in Suresh, the Supreme Court of 
Canada contrasted the “extensive” procedural protections available at the 
reasonableness determination stage against the lack of similar 
protections at the danger opinion stage.31 Based largely on these 
                                                                                                             
27
 The reasonableness hearing was suspended pending the outcome of the PRRA 
application: see former IRPA, supra, note 8, at s. 79. The PRRA decision weighs the danger of 
torture, or risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment the named person would face 
if removed against the danger they pose if permitted to remain in Canada: see IRPA, supra, note 8, 
at ss. 97, 112(3), 113(d) and 114(b). Where the inadmissibility is based on serious criminality, the 
test is “danger to the public in Canada” (s. 113(d)(i)). Where the inadmissibility is based on security, 
violating human or international rights or organized criminality, the test is “danger ... to the security 
of Canada” (s. 113(d)(ii)). 
28
 See, e.g., Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] F.C.J. No. 
437, 2005 FC 355 (F.C.A.); Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2005] 
F.C.J. No. 173, 2005 FC 156 (F.C.A.); Mahjoub v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2006] F.C.J. No. 1862, 2006 FC 1503 (F.C.A.).  
29
 Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] S.C.J. No. 27, 
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 (S.C.C.). 
30
 Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1996] F.C.J. No. 937, 119 
F.T.R. 80 (F.C.A.), affg [1995] F.C.J. No. 1190, [1995] 3 F.C. 669 (F.C.T.D.), leave to appeal to 
S.C.C. refused [1996] S.C.C.A. No. 496, [1997] 2 S.C.R. v (S.C.C.). 
31
 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 
1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 117 (S.C.C.), stating the certificate provisions “allow for meaningful participation”. 
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decisions, lower courts had consistently ruled that the IRPA certificate 
regime was constitutional.32 
The decision in Charkaoui, of course, departed from this previous 
case law on the constitutionality of the security certificate process and 
established a new starting point in the constitutional dialogue between 
the judiciary and Parliament on the issue. However, in considering how 
that dialogue set the parameters for future legislative action, it is 
important to identify not only the specific constitutional deficiencies the 
Court found in the certificate process, but also to recognize those aspects 
of the regime which the Court found to comply with the Charter and the 
scope of permissible action which the Court left open to Parliament. 
In this respect, it is significant that the Court endorsed the general 
objectives of the IRPA security certificate scheme. The Court accepted 
that it is legitimate for Parliament to use immigration law to deport and 
detain non-citizens who pose a threat to national security.33 The Court 
also affirmed its earlier decision in Chiarelli that a deportation scheme 
that applies to non-citizens but not to citizens does not, for that reason 
alone, violate section 15 of the Charter.34 In doing so, the Court 
impliedly rejected the suggestion that the state is somehow obligated to 
prosecute under the criminal law instead of seeking deportation under 
immigration law when faced with non-citizens suspected of involvement 
in terrorist activities.35 The Court also expressly noted that so long as 
detention pursuant to a certificate remains linked to an immigration 
purpose, it does not amount to discrimination.36 
The Court also held that detention or release on conditions pending 
deportation pursuant to the certificate provisions violates neither sections 
7 nor 12 of the Charter, even where that detention or release on 
conditions might continue for extended or indeterminate periods of time. 
In doing so, the Court clarified that detention under immigration law is 
not unconstitutional where it is reasonably necessary for deportation 
                                                                                                             
32
 In the three cases at issue in Charkaoui, the courts below had dismissed all the 
constitutional challenges to various aspects of the certificate regime: see Re Charkaoui, [2003] 
F.C.J. No. 1815, 2003 FC 1418 (F.C.A.), affd [2004] F.C.J. No. 2060, 2004 FCA 421 (F.C.A.); 
Almrei v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] F.C.J. No. 509, 2004 FC 420 
(F.C.A.), affd [2005] F.C.J. No. 213, 2005 FCA 54 (F.C.A.); and Re Harkat, [2005] F.C.J. No. 481, 
2005 FC 393 (F.C.A.), affd [2005] F.C.J. No. 1467, 2005 FCA 285 (F.C.A.). 
33
 Charkaoui, [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at paras. 68-69 (S.C.C.). 
34
 Id., at para. 129. 
35
 A number of intervenors before the Supreme Court of Canada, including the Canadian 
Council for Refugees, had made this argument. 
36
 Charkaoui, supra, note 33, at paras. 130-32. 
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purposes and a meaningful detention review process offers relief against 
the possibility of indefinite detention. The Court was satisfied that, 
properly interpreted, the IRPA contained a robust process for periodic 
judicial review of detention or release on conditions which permitted the 
courts to assess the relevant context and circumstances of the individual 
case, including: the reasons for detention; length of detention; reasons 
for delay in deportation; anticipated future length of detention; and the 
availability of alternatives to detention.37 
In addition, the Court dismissed a variety of other constitutional 
challenges to the IRPA certificate scheme. For example, the Court held 
that the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard for establishing 
inadmissibility or grounds for detention did not violate section 7 of the 
Charter. Similarly, the Court took no issue with the IRPA provision 
directing the judge to determine the reasonableness of the certificate 
rather than its correctness. The Court was satisfied that these standards 
required a searching review of the evidence, and therefore did not detract 
from the right to a fair hearing.38 The Court also held that unwritten 
constitutional principles relating to the rule of law neither require a full 
right of appeal from the reasonableness determination, nor prohibit the 
Ministers from issuing warrants for arrest and detention if they have 
reasonable grounds to believe that a named person is inadmissible on 
specified grounds.39 
Although the Court endorsed the general objectives of the IRPA 
certificate process and found some of its features to be consistent with 
the Constitution, it also found that two specific aspects of the former 
statutory regime violated the Charter. First, the Court held that the 
absence of a timely detention review process for foreign nationals 
resulted in arbitrary detention and violated sections 9 and 10(c) of the 
Charter.40 The Court afforded Parliament no flexibility in determining 
how to address this shortcoming and, through a combination of striking 
down and reading in, ensured that both foreign nationals and permanent 
residents had access to timely and periodic detention reviews.41 
                                                                                                             
37
 Id., at paras. 95-128. The Court distinguished the decision of the House of Lords in A. v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (H.L.) which struck down the control 
order regime as incompatible with art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
38
 Id., at paras. 38-42. 
39
 Id., at paras. 133-37. 
40
 Id., at paras. 3, 90-94. 
41
 Id., at paras. 141-42. 
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More significantly, the Court held that the in camera, ex parte 
hearing process and ability of the Ministers to rely on confidential 
security information not disclosed to the named person or their lawyer 
violated section 7 of the Charter. The Court found that this process was 
inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice because it lacked 
two features required to ensure a fair hearing. First, because the 
provisions limited the operation of the adversarial system but failed to 
extend to judges all the powers associated with an inquisitorial system, 
the Court was concerned that it may have resulted in judicial 
determinations not based on all relevant facts or legal arguments.42 Chief 
Justice McLachlin, for the unanimous Court, explained: 
The designated judge under the IRPA does not possess the full and 
independent powers to gather evidence that exist in the inquisitorial 
process. At the same time, the named person is not given the disclosure 
and the right to participate in the proceedings that characterize the 
adversarial process. The result is a concern that the designated judge, 
despite his or her best efforts to get all the relevant evidence, may be 
obliged — perhaps unknowingly — to make the required decision 
based on only part of the relevant evidence.43 
Second, the Court found that non-disclosure of the confidential security 
information which formed the basis for the certificate deprived named 
persons of the right to know and answer the case against them.44 On this 
point, the Court drew a connection between the named person’s right to 
know the case to meet and the judge’s ability to protect the integrity of 
the judicial process: 
The fairness of the IRPA procedure rests entirely on the shoulders of 
the designated judge. Those shoulders cannot by themselves bear the 
heavy burden of assuring, in fact and appearance, that the decision on 
the reasonableness of the certificate is impartial, is based on a full view 
of the facts and law, and reflects the named person’s knowledge of the 
case to meet. The judge, working under the constraints imposed by the 
IRPA, simply cannot fill the vacuum left by the removal of the 
traditional guarantees of a fair hearing.45 
While the Court therefore concluded that the certificate process 
violated the right to a fair hearing, the Court was cautious not to suggest 
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 Id., at paras. 48-52. 
43
 Id., at para. 50. 
44
 Id., at paras. 53-65. 
45
 Id., at para. 63. 
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that section 7 of the Charter mandated full disclosure of all confidential 
security information to the named person and his or her lawyer. Indeed, 
the Court clearly stated that the right to know the case to be met is not 
absolute, that national security considerations can limit the extent of 
disclosure that must be provided to an affected individual and that 
societal concerns form part of the relevant context for determining the 
scope of the applicable principles of fundamental justice.46 In addition, in 
its conclusion on the section 7 issue, the Court indicated that the right to 
a fair hearing could be satisfied either by giving the named person the 
information required to know the case to meet, or a “substantial 
substitute” for that information.47 
The Court went on to find that the prima facie violation of section 7 
could not be justified as a reasonable limit prescribed by law. Although 
satisfied that the certificate process had a pressing and substantial 
objective and that the non-disclosure of confidential security information 
was rationally connected to that objective, the Court found that the 
process was not minimally impairing of the named person’s Charter 
rights.48 In this respect, the Court identified several less intrusive 
alternatives which use a more adversarial process to ensure that an 
independent party — other than the designated judge — tests the 
confidential security information with a view to protecting the named 
person’s interests.49 These alternatives included: the use of independent 
counsel before the Security Intelligence Review Committee (the 
“SIRC”);50 the use of special advocates in the United Kingdom before 
the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (the “SIAC”);51 the 
Canada Evidence Act process;52 the Air India trial example of disclosure 
to defence counsel based on undertakings;53 and the role of commission 
counsel in the Arar Inquiry.54 The Court concluded that the availability 
of these less intrusive alternatives to the IRPA certificate process 
demonstrated that it could not be justified under section 1. 
                                                                                                             
46
 Id., at paras. 57-58. 
47
 Id., at para. 61. 
48
 Id., at para. 68. 
49
 Id., at paras. 69-70. 
50
 Id., at paras. 71-76. 
51
 Id., at paras. 80-84. 
52
 Id., at para. 77. 
53
 Id., at para. 78. 
54
 Id., at para. 79. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) RESPONSE TO CHARKAOUI 425 
However, at the section 1 stage the Court again gave Parliament 
considerable latitude to design a new process which would better protect 
the named person’s section 7 interests without compromising security. 
The Court recognized that Parliament is not required to use the perfect or 
least restrictive alternative to achieve its objective.55 The Court suggested 
that section 1 could be satisfied by providing some form of special 
counsel to “objectively review the material with a view to protecting the 
named person’s interest”, but expressed no strong preference for any of 
the particular alternatives it had identified.56 In its conclusion on the 
section 1 issue, the Court expressly stated that while more must be done 
for the certificate process to meet the requirements of a free and 
democratic society, “[p]recisely what more should be done is a matter 
for Parliament to decide”.57 The Court also suspended its declaration of 
unconstitutionality for a period of one year, citing only the need to give 
Parliament time to amend the law.58 
IV. PARLIAMENT’S RESPONSE: BILL C-3 AND  
THE SPECIAL ADVOCATE REGIME 
Government officials and Parliament used the one-year suspension 
period to study the Charkaoui decision and carefully consider the 
options available for responding to it. Those considerations were 
informed not only by the Court’s ruling, but also the broader public 
debate surrounding the security certificate process — including the 
comments of the House of Commons and Senate committees who 
reviewed the Anti-terrorism Act,59 the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration’s report on security 
certificates and detention,60 and the work of various academics and 
                                                                                                             
55
 Id., at para. 85.  
56
 Id., at para. 86. 
57
 Id., at para. 87. 
58
 Id., at para. 140. 
59
 Fundamental Justice in Extraordinary Times: Main Report of the Special Senate 
Committee on the Anti-terrorism Act (Ottawa: February, 2007), at 30-42, 100-113, online at: 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/anti-e/rep-e/rep02feb07.htm> and House 
Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, Subcommittee on the Review of the 
Anti-terrorism Act, Rights, Limits, Security: A Comprehensive Review of the Anti-terrorism Act and 
related Issues (Ottawa: March 2007), at 67-81, online at: <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/ 
CommitteePublication.aspx?CDN=10804&Lang=1&SourceId=199086> [hereinafter “Rights, Limits, 
Security”]. 
60
 Twelfth Report of the House Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 
“Detention Centres and Security Certificates”, adopted by the Committee on March 27, 2007, 
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private sector lawyers on these issues.61 Consultations with SIRC 
officials regarding their independent counsel process, as well as with 
officials in the United Kingdom about their SIAC special advocate 
regime, also contributed to the development of policy options. 
Bill C-3 is the result of these efforts. It was tabled in the House of 
Commons on October 22, 2007. Beginning on November 27, 2007, the 
Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security heard from 
over 20 witnesses during eight days of committee hearings, and then 
reported the Bill back to the House of Commons with amendments on 
December 10, 2007. The Senate passed the Bill without amendment and 
it received royal assent on February 14, 2008. It came into force by order 
of the Governor in Council on February 22, 2008 — one day before the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s declaration of invalidity would have 
expired. 
The amendments Bill C-3 makes to the IRPA certificate process 
demonstrate the different levels at which the dialogue between the 
judiciary and Parliament may take place. In those areas where the Court 
held that the Charter mandates a specific result, Parliament responded 
accordingly. For example, the provisions for detention and release on 
conditions now ensure that both permanent residents and foreign 
nationals named in a certificate have detention reviews within 48 hours 
of arrest. They also establish a system for regular six-month reviews of 
detention or conditions of release which applies both before and after the 
certificate is determined to be reasonable.62  
Conversely, even in some areas where the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the previous certificate regime, Parliament elected to 
address some issues that continued to affect the perceived fairness of the 
process. In this regard, Bill C-3 provides a right of appeal from a 
decision on reasonableness or detention review where the judge certifies 
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a serious question of general importance.63 Named persons therefore now 
have the same rights of appeal as other litigants in immigration matters.64 
Similarly, foreign nationals named in a certificate are no longer subject 
to automatic detention when the certificate is issued. Instead, as with 
permanent residents, the Ministers must decide whether to issue a 
warrant for arrest.65 In addition, and although it was not in issue before 
the Court in Charkaoui, Bill C-3 codifies earlier Federal Court decisions 
and expressly states that evidence obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment is inadmissible in certificate 
proceedings.66 
Finally, on the major issue of the right to a fair hearing where the 
Court indicated that the Charter required greater procedural protections 
but did not stipulate precisely what more should be done, Parliament 
studied the options available and adopted the solution it considered most 
appropriate: a special advocate regime.  
In general, special advocates are security-cleared lawyers who are 
independent from both government and the courts. They are granted 
access to the confidential security information on the condition they not 
disclose it to anybody else, including the named person and their lawyer. 
The Bill requires the Court to appoint special advocates to protect the 
interests of the named person at hearings from which the public, the 
named person and their lawyer are excluded. They can challenge both 
the government’s claim that information should remain confidential, as 
well as the merits of the case against the named person presented in 
closed hearings. In this way, special advocates will add an adversarial 
context to the closed hearings and thereby help to ensure that the named 
person’s right to a fair hearing is respected. At the same time, Bill C-3 
also includes measures to minimize the risk that confidential security 
information might be improperly disclosed as a result of the new special 
advocate regime. In this manner, Bill C-3 resolves the tension between 
respecting the named person’s Charter-protected right to a fair hearing 
and the interest in protecting confidential security information. 
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While Charkaoui addressed only the security certificate process, the 
new special advocate provisions also apply, with the necessary 
modifications, to admissibility hearings and detention reviews before the 
Immigration and Refugee Board where the Minister seeks to rely on 
confidential security information.67 Bill C-3 also gives the Federal Court 
the discretion to determine whether the considerations of fairness and 
natural justice require that a special advocate be appointed for the 
judicial review of other decisions made under IRPA where the decision-
maker relied on confidential security information which cannot be 
disclosed.68 
The basic premise underlying the IRPA special advocate scheme, its 
various features, their rationale and subsequent implementation are 
discussed briefly under separate subheadings below. 
1. Special Advocate Role and Powers 
Section 85.1(1) states the role of the special advocate is to “protect 
the interests” of the named person during the closed hearings. Section 
85.1(2) empowers special advocates to fulfil this role in two ways. First, 
they may challenge the Ministers’ claim that information must remain 
confidential because disclosure to the public and the named person or 
that person’s counsel would be injurious to national security or endanger 
the safety of any person. Second, they may challenge the relevance, 
reliability and sufficiency of the information and other evidence the 
Ministers adduce at the closed hearings to make their case. Section 85.2 
allows special advocates to make oral and written submissions with 
respect to the information the Ministers present at closed hearings, to 
cross-examine any witnesses who testify during the closed hearings and 
to exercise any other powers that the judge considers necessary to 
protect the interests of the named person. 
This wording of the special advocate’s role in section 85.1(1) is 
significant. It is not simply an element of the IRPA special advocate 
regime; it is the model’s defining principle. The special advocate does 
not “represent” the named person in the same sense that a lawyer 
represents a client. Indeed, section 85.1(3) expressly states that the 
special advocate is not in a solicitor-client relationship with the named 
person. This limitation avoids creating a potential conflict between the 
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duties of loyalty and candour lawyers owe to clients and the special 
advocate’s obligation not to disclose the confidential security 
information. In this way, the core premise underlying the special 
advocate model avoids some of the thorny ethical and practical 
difficulties inherent in the Air India model, which the Supreme Court 
itself acknowledged in Charkaoui.69 
However, and notwithstanding the absence of a solicitor-client 
relationship with the named person, special advocates are not just an 
objective third party added to the closed hearing process. Instead, they 
are directly aligned with the interests of the named person and play an 
adversarial function vis-à-vis the government. This is consistent with the 
suggestion in Charkaoui that the closed hearing process requires some 
form of special counsel to objectively test the government’s case “with a 
view to protecting the named person’s interests”, and the 
recommendations of the Senate Anti-terrorism Act review committee.70 It 
also distinguishes the basic premise underlying the IRPA special 
advocate model from that underlying the SIRC independent counsel 
model or the Arar Inquiry commission counsel model.  
Lawyers acting as SIRC counsel or commission counsel are 
independent in the sense that they are counsel to SIRC or the 
commission and independent from government. They are not, however, 
independent from the tribunal which they serve. Indeed, the basic 
premise underlying these independent counsel models is the need to 
extend the tribunal’s own ability to ensure a fair hearing: the overriding 
duty of independent counsel is to the tribunal, not to individual 
complainants; and their role is to protect the integrity of the tribunal’s 
process, not the interests of the individual excluded from the closed 
hearings. While those interests often may be aligned, that will not 
necessarily always be the case. In contrast, Bill C-3 expressly assigns 
special advocates a more adversarial role directly aligned with the named 
person’s interests. In this way, the core premise of the IRPA special 
                                                                                                             
69
 See Charkaoui, [2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350, at para. 78 (S.C.C.), where the 
Court stated: “Disclosure in a specific trial, to a select group of counsel on undertakings, may not 
provide a working model for general deportation legislation that must deal with a wide variety of 
counsel in a host of cases”. See also Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] S.C.J. No. 41, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332, 
at para. 49 (S.C.C.) where, although not ruling directly on the validity of the order granting defence 
counsel access to confidential information based on his undertaking, the Court nonetheless 
expressed some concern and noted that it was “difficult to anticipate all the difficulties that such an 
order may pose”. 
70
 Charkaoui, id., at paras. 69, 86; Fundamental Justice in Extraordinary Times, supra, 
note 59, at 33-35. 
430 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
advocate model goes further than the SIRC independent counsel model 
to protect the interests of the named person and make the process more 
truly adversarial in nature. 
2. Communications with Named Person 
The IRPA special advocate provisions contemplate two phases in the 
communication between the special advocate and the named person 
during certificate proceedings. The first phase occurs before the special 
advocate is given access to the confidential security information. During 
this phase, communication between the named person and special 
advocate is unrestricted. The second phase begins once the special 
advocate is given access to the confidential security information. During 
this phase, the special advocate cannot communicate with the named 
person unless and except as authorized by the judge.71 
The first phase provides the special advocate an opportunity to learn 
as much as possible about the named person’s case in response to the 
allegations. Once the judge appoints the special advocate, he or she 
receives the same summary of confidential security information and any 
other public evidence which is provided to the named person and his or 
her lawyer to ensure this special advocate is reasonably informed of the 
Ministers’ case.72 Based on this open information, the special advocate 
can meet with the named person and his or her lawyer to discuss the case 
without restriction. Although they are not in a solicitor-client relationship, 
section 85.1(4) provides that communications between the named person 
and special advocate are subject to the same privilege that would attach 
as if a solicitor-client relationship did exist. In addition, special advocates 
cannot be compelled to give testimony in any proceeding about 
communications with a named person.73 Named persons therefore can 
provide any and all potentially relevant information to the special 
advocates during the first phase, without fear that providing information 
which may prove to be inculpatory would somehow disadvantage the 
named person’s position in the closed certificate hearings or any other 
proceedings. 
The IRPA regime does not bar all communication between the 
special advocate and the named person during the second phase. Instead, 
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it seeks to balance the special advocate’s ability to effectively perform 
his or her function with the need to protect against the risk that special 
advocates might inadvertently disclose confidential security information 
to the named persons or their lawyers. This is consistent with the Senate 
Anti-terrorism Act review committee’s recommendations, which not 
only encouraged a scheme that permitted ongoing communication 
between the special advocate and named person, but also recommended 
that Parliament adopt appropriate safeguards as a part of any such 
scheme to ensure that matters of national security remain secret.74 The 
process for balancing these two objectives under Bill C-3 requires the 
designated judge — not the government — to determine how best to 
reconcile, in the particular circumstances of any given case, the potential 
benefits of further communication between the named person and special 
advocate with the potential risks of inadvertent disclosure of confidential 
security information that any such communications may raise.  
Criticisms of this aspect of Bill C-3 typically emphasize that the 
special advocate’s ability to effectively perform his or her role may, in 
some cases, require him or her to go back to the named person for 
information only after seeing the confidential security information.75 
However, Bill C-3 does allow for this possibility if the judge is satisfied 
that the scope and form of the communications are appropriate. What 
Bill C-3 also requires the judge to take into account — and what the 
criticisms frequently ignore or understate — is the countervailing and 
legitimate state interest in preventing inadvertent disclosure of the 
confidential security information. The very nature of this information 
means that the stakes are high if inadvertent disclosure occurs: 
confidential informers may be identified and their lives or security 
thereby placed in jeopardy; an ongoing investigation may be 
compromised and years of valuable intelligence-gathering rendered 
useless. The need to protect confidential informers from the risk of 
possible retribution is particularly sensitive in the national security 
context. Bill C-3 therefore provides a reasonable oversight mechanism 
which aims to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of any such 
information. Proposed alternatives — like the suggestion that an 
independent third party, such as a member of SIRC, be present during 
any communications between the named person and special advocate 
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during the closed phase76 — may help identify inadvertent disclosure 
after it happens, but would not necessarily help prevent it before it 
occurs in the same way as does Bill C-3. 
In the United Kingdom, the need for special advocates to obtain 
judicial authorization to communicate with the named person during the 
“closed” phase of proceedings has attracted criticism from parliamentary 
committees.77 Special advocates themselves reportedly are reluctant to 
seek judicial authorization in part because the relevant statutory 
provisions require proposed communications to be reviewed not only by 
the judge but also by the government.78 However, notwithstanding those 
criticisms, the British government has maintained its position that this 
requirement is an appropriate safeguard, and declined to amend the 
relevant statutory provisions.79 Moreover, the House of Lords declined to 
seize upon these criticisms in its October 2007 ruling that proceedings 
involving special advocates generally will not fail to comply with the 
right to a fair hearing protected under Article 6 of the European 
Convention.80 Indeed, at least one of the Law Lords encouraged all 
parties involved in the cases to consider whether special advocates 
should be given leave to ask specific and carefully tailored questions of 
the named person so as to preserve the fairness of the trial.81 The 
comments imply not only that the statutory provision itself is reasonable, 
but also that those involved in the process — including not only the 
judge, but also the special advocate and government counsel — have 
some responsibility to use it appropriately. 
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3. The Special Advocate List 
Subsection 85(1) requires the Minister of Justice to establish and 
publish a list of persons who may act as special advocates. The creation 
of a list ensures that there is a qualified pool of security-cleared lawyers 
eligible to be appointed to specific cases as required and without delay. 
The Minister also must ensure that special advocates are provided with 
“adequate administrative support and resources”.82 These responsibilities 
are consistent with the Minister of Justice’s statutory responsibility for 
matters relating to the administration of justice under the Department of 
Justice Act.83 They also reflect the importance of the special advocate in 
not only protecting the interests of the named person, but also preserving 
the fairness, integrity and efficiency of the justice system. 
While the Bill makes the Minister of Justice responsible for 
establishing the special advocate list, the Minister has established an 
independent selection committee to assist with this process. The 
selection committee is comprised of retired Federal Court judge Andrew 
MacKay and one representative from each of the Federation of Canadian 
Law Societies (the “FLSC”) and the Canadian Bar Association (“CBA”). 
The Department of Justice first invited expressions of interest from 
candidates wishing to be named to the special advocate list on December 
22, 2007, and extended the initial deadline from January 15, 2008 to 
February 1, 2008 in order to ensure that interested individuals had 
sufficient time to apply. The selection committee reviewed all 
applications received, and recommended that the Minister of Justice 
name some of the best qualified candidates to the special advocate list. 
To date, the Minister has named 27 candidates who the selection 
committee recommended and who then obtained the requisite security 
clearance.84 
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4. Special Advocate Qualifications 
Section 87.2(2) requires that special advocates be members in good 
standing of a provincial bar and not be employed in the federal public 
administration or otherwise associated with the federal public 
administration in a way that would impair their ability to protect the 
interests of the named person. This confirms that the special advocate 
must be independent of the government. 
The Minister of Justice established a number of other qualifications 
for the selection committee to consider when appointing special 
advocates to the initial list. Those qualifications required that special 
advocates have a minimum of 10 years’ good standing in a provincial 
bar, and litigation experience that demonstrates skill in the examination 
of witnesses and in oral and written advocacy. In addition, although not 
a mandatory requirement, experience in the fields of immigration law, 
criminal law, national security law or human rights law was considered 
an asset. These qualifications were developed in consultation with 
representatives from the FLSC and the CBA. They are intended to 
ensure that special advocates have the requisite skills and experience to 
effectively fulfil their statutory role and responsibilities.85  
In addition to these qualifications, special advocates also must obtain 
Top Secret security clearance from CSIS before they can be named to 
the list. This is widely acknowledged as an essential minimum 
qualification for special advocates.86 Under both the SIRC and SIAC 
models, special counsel’s access to confidential security information and 
participation in closed hearings is contingent on obtaining appropriate 
security clearance. Special advocates therefore have to go through the 
same security screening measures that CSIS uses to determine whether 
government officials are sufficiently reliable and trustworthy to be 
granted access to sensitive security information.87 In addition, as has 
been the case with lawyers employed as commission counsel for recent 
federal commissions of inquiry involving confidential security 
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information, special advocates are permanently bound to secrecy under 
the Security of Information Act.88 
5. Choosing the Special Advocate for a Particular Case 
While the Minister of Justice is responsible for establishing the 
special advocate list, the judge who hears a certificate case is responsible 
for appointing a lawyer from the list to act as special advocate in a 
particular case. Subsection 83(1)(b) requires that the judge make this 
appointment after hearing representations both from the government and 
the named person, and after giving “particular consideration and weight 
to the preferences” of the named person. Subsection 83(1.2) elaborates 
on this point and requires the judge to appoint the named person’s choice 
of special advocate from the list, unless the judge is satisfied that the 
appointment would unreasonably delay the proceedings or result in a 
conflict of interest or risk of inadvertent disclosure of the confidential 
security information.89 The weight given to the named person’s choice of 
special advocate under the IRPA scheme addresses concerns which had 
previously been raised about the SIAC model where the named person 
had little or no say in who would be appointed as special advocate, and 
is consistent with the recommendations of the Senate Anti-terrorism Act 
review committee.90 
These provisions aim to balance the named person’s interest in 
selecting the special advocate the named person feels will best protect 
his or her interests in the closed hearings with the need to avoid putting 
special advocates in situations that are incompatible with their ethical 
obligations as lawyers or that present an increased risk of inadvertent 
disclosure. The judge’s power to decline to appoint the named person’s 
choice of special advocate to a particular case due to a conflict of interest 
applies familiar conflict concepts to the unique situation of lawyers 
acting as special advocates.91 In this context, the conflicting duties may 
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not be between different past or present clients, but rather between duties 
owed as a lawyer to a client and their duties as a special advocate not to 
disclose confidential security information. The judge’s power to refuse 
an appointment where it would give rise to a risk of inadvertent 
disclosure resembles the concept of “tainting” under the SIAC scheme, 
and is based on a similar rationale.92 The provision is not intended to 
allow the judge to reassess the reliability of a lawyer who already has 
obtained security clearance from CSIS and been named to the special 
advocate list by the Minister of Justice, but rather requires the judge to 
examine whether a risk of inadvertent disclosure may result if a special 
advocate acts in two or more cases that involve overlapping or related 
confidential security information. 
The government accepts that, depending on the complexity of the 
case and the volume of confidential security information at issue and any 
other relevant factors, the Court may determine that two special 
advocates should be appointed to protect the interests of the named 
person in a security certificate case. This is consistent with practice in 
the United Kingdom, where two special advocates generally are 
appointed for at least the more complex SIAC cases. The Federal Court 
has appointed two special advocates for each of the five current 
certificate cases. 
6. Support and Resources 
As mentioned, section 85(3) makes the Minister of Justice 
responsible for ensuring that special advocates are provided with 
“adequate administrative support and resources”. In the United 
Kingdom, a lack of administrative support and resources for special 
advocates previously attracted criticism, and resulted in the creation of 
the Special Advocate Support Office (“SASO”) within the Treasury 
Board Solicitors’ Department of the Attorney General’s Office to 
provide a range of support services.93 Based largely on these 
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developments in the United Kingdom, commentators have emphasized 
the importance of ensuring that special advocates have an appropriate 
support apparatus under the IRPA regime.94 
At this time, the Minister of Justice has arranged to provide special 
advocates with various administrative and resource support through a 
combination of the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”), the Federal 
Courts Administration Service (the “CAS”) and the Immigration and 
Refugee Board (the “IRB”). Under these arrangements, the Programs 
Branch within DOJ’s Policy Sector — a section of the DOJ separate 
from that responsible for conduct of litigation in security certificate 
cases — is responsible for coordinating the work of the selection 
committee, publishing the special advocate list, and some of the more 
routine administrative matters such as paying special advocate accounts. 
In addition, the CAS will ensure that special advocates are provided with 
secure facilities for consultation of the confidential security information 
and some administrative support when they are working on the secure 
site premises. The Minister has made similar arrangements with the IRB 
for special advocates assigned to section 86 cases. Representatives from 
DOJ, CAS and the IRB will be consulting directly with special 
advocates to discuss further support and resources they may require. 
In addition, and as part of fulfilling the Minister’s responsibilities 
under section 85(3), the DOJ has organized week-long training sessions 
for the lawyers named to the special advocate list. The instructors for the 
training sessions have included senior federal government officials, 
leading academics on national security law issues, prominent private 
sector immigration lawyers and barristers who have acted as special 
advocates in the United Kingdom. The subjects have included: specific 
legal principles and processes relevant to certificate cases; general 
background on immigration law; and the role of the special advocate. 
The training also included presentations by CSIS officials on how to 
read confidential security information, as well as the protocols for 
handling such information. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The decision in Charkaoui and legislative response in Bill C-3 
demonstrate how the Charter dialogue between the judiciary and 
legislatures can enhance the protection of constitutionally entrenched 
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rights and freedoms while preserving the ability of elected officials to 
pursue legitimate policy objectives. In Charkaoui, the Supreme Court of 
Canada challenged Parliament to devise a new hearing process for 
certificate cases which would resolve the tension between accountable 
constitutional governance and national security.95 In doing so, the Court 
clearly accepted that more than one solution was available to resolve that 
tension, and that Parliament was better positioned to decide on which 
solution should be adopted. Parliament, after considering the various 
options left open to it by the Court, decided to meet the challenge by 
adding a special advocate to the certificate process.  
The various features of the special advocate regime — including 
the role and powers of special advocates, the provisions relating to 
communications, the special advocate selection process and qualifications, 
and the support and resources available to special advocates — all are 
designed to ensure that the interests of the named person in a fair hearing 
are adequately protected, while also minimizing the risk that confidential 
security information might be disclosed. Of course, not everybody 
agrees that the constitutional dialogue has resulted in a process which 
now complies with the Charter. Indeed, counsel for at least some of the 
named persons in the current certificate cases already have filed 
challenges to the constitutionality of Bill C-3. However, as the Supreme 
Court itself reiterated in Charkaoui, Parliament is not required to use the 
perfect or least restrictive alternative to achieve its legislative objective. 
In our respectful view, the IRPA special advocate regime does 
undoubtedly better protect the named person’s right to a fair hearing 
while still ensuring that national security is not compromised. It is 
difficult to see how — particularly in light of the Court’s deference to 
Parliament’s legislative choices and the rational explanations available 
to justify the various aspects of the special advocate regime which have 
attracted criticism — the new balance between protecting fundamental 
rights and freedoms and safeguarding national security which Parliament 
has achieved under Bill C-3 would fail to pass constitutional scrutiny. 
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